Accountability: Understanding the effect of governance structures on land ambulance services in Ontario, connected by Consolidated Municipal Services Management (CMSM) agreements by Longeway, Michael
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
MPA Major Research Papers Local Government Program 
7-1-2021 
Accountability: Understanding the effect of governance structures 
on land ambulance services in Ontario, connected by 




Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lgp-mrps 
 Part of the Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Longeway, Michael, "Accountability: Understanding the effect of governance structures on land 
ambulance services in Ontario, connected by Consolidated Municipal Services Management (CMSM) 
agreements" (2021). MPA Major Research Papers. 209. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lgp-mrps/209 
This Major Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Local Government Program at 
Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in MPA Major Research Papers by an authorized 
administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
 
 
Accountability: Understanding the effect of governance structures on land 
ambulance services in Ontario, connected by Consolidated Municipal Services 
Management (CMSM) agreements 
 
Subject Keywords: Accountability, Ambulance Services, Intermunicipal 
Collaboration, Service Delivery 
 
Geographical keywords: Barrie, Belleville, Brockville, Cornwall, Elgin, Essex, 
Frontenac, Gananoque, Guelph, Hastings, Kingston, Lanark, Leeds & Grenville, 
London, Middlesex, Orillia, Pelee, Pembroke, Perth, Peterborough, Peterborough 
County, Prescott, Quite West, Renfrew, Simcoe, Smith’s Falls, St. Mary’s, St. 
Thomas, United Counties of Leeds and Grenville, United Counties of Stormont, 
Dundas and Glengarry Wellington, Windsor 
 





The Local Government Program 
Department of Political Science 








Ontario has seen significant changes across the municipal landscape, including the 
realignment of service responsibilities. One of the products of this realignment was the 
introduction of the CMSM program in 1998, which saw local municipalities take on the 
responsibilities for many services, including land ambulance. 
Land ambulance is an important life-saving service (Aringhieri et al. 2017). Decision-makers 
must ensure that such services must be delivered with optimal performance. As a public service 
in Ontario, this includes democratic performance. Crucial to the anchorage of democratic 
performance is accountability. 
Accountability is a transaction of information, dialogue, and rewards/sanctions (Brandsma 
and Schillemans 2012). It is an important component of democracy. While much attention has 
been paid to accountability at the provincial and federal levels, there is a growing body of 
research into accountability at the local level (Spicer 2017; Arnbuckle 2018).  
This study aims to contribute to this growing body of literature by considering the vital 
service of land ambulance and the unique institutions of city-county separation along with the 
imposed CMSM program. 
By asking the question “In areas where city-county institutions are established, to what extent 
is the accountability gap in land ambulance services agreements effected by the governance 
model of the service provider”, this study contributes to the empirical data around accountability, 
inter-municipal agreements, and SPBs. 
Through a quantitative test and description, this paper first quantifies the extent of 
accountability in 13 city-county services, confirming that while land-ambulance services 
generally perform well, governance structures do correlate with improved performance. 
Additionally, using a comparative case study, this study qualitatively describes the findings in 
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two similar municipalities with different governance structures, supporting the GAT findings and 
describing how municipalities can improve their accountability. 
In sum, this paper finds that in the 13 agreements/services studied, SPB governance 
structures have superior performance to direct and contract delivery. However, partnerships that 
have or can produce annual reports, create clear complaints processes, establish joint committees 
(or boards) with representation from all partner municipalities, do correlate with a strong 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the 1990s, Ontario underwent significant changes across the municipal 
landscape. In particular, the election of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1995 was elected 
on a promise to lower taxes (Ibbitson 1997). To accomplish this, the Province pursued the 
elimination and amalgamation of municipalities (Siegel 2005). Further, Ontario set out to upload 
and download services with municipalities (Graham and Phillips 1998). Accordingly, one of the 
tools used by the Province was the introduction of the CMSM system in 1998, under the Local 
Services Realignment framework (Ontario 1998). With the creation of the CMSM system, local 
municipalities took on delivery and partial funding role in many services (Spicer 2015). The 
Provincial government “downloaded” these responsibilities, in an effort to, among other reasons, 
improve fiscal efficiency (Ontario 1999). The services that municipalities found themselves 
responsible for were social housing, childcare, social assistance, public health, and land 
ambulance. 
In total, the province created 37 CMSMs for southern Ontario, along with 10 district 
social services boards in northern Ontario. These CMSMs in effect forced inter-municipal 
services agreements, as designated CMSMs became responsible for service delivery for their 
neighbouring municipalities (Spicer 2015). Previous research has been completed measuring 
accountability in these types of relationships (Spicer 2017, Lyons and Spicer 2018). Further, 
research has been completed on CMSM organizations (Spicer 2015, Spicer 2016) in Ontario. 
What remains to be studied, however, are the relationships specific to land ambulance service, 
which was “downloaded” as part of this provincial realignment.  
Consequently, the Harris government in Ontario downloaded land-ambulance delivery 
from the province to designated CMSM’s. This decision was in part due to findings of the 1998 
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Ontario Auditor General’s report, which highlights accountability as one of the goals of local 
services realignment (Ontario 1998; Prno 2002). With the stated goal of increasing 
accountability, one should question if this is achieved equally despite the governance model that 
the CMSM chooses for land ambulance delivery. 
Land ambulance services are important. Paramedics provide care throughout Ontario, 
through land and air ambulance services, to residents daily and play a vital role in saving lives by 
reducing the rate of mortality and morbidity (Aringhieri et al. 2017). Notably, modern paramedic 
services have decreased the mortality from a heart attack from 8.9 percent to just 1.9 percent (Le 
May et al. 2006). Crucially, paramedic care is common throughout Ontario. In 2018, provincial 
data reveals that 1,151,360 patients were transported by paramedics (Ontario, 2019). 
Land ambulance delivery models affect their democratic performance (Longeway 2020). 
Democratic performance can include measures such as authorization, efficiency, or 
accountability, and there has been longstanding interest in measuring and analyzing these 
performance criteria within public agencies (Boyne 2006). Decision-makers must be informed by 
research to decide which model is best for the service being provided. Unfortunately, despite the 
equally important service they provide, land ambulance services have not received the same 
attention as has been paid to the delivery models for police and fire services (Found 2012; 
Sancton 2015). Delivery models for ambulance services in Canada vary by province. In many 
provinces, responsibility has been retained by the Province for land ambulance services (BC 
Health Services 2020; Longeway 2020). Other provinces, such as Alberta, have regionalized the 
provision of land ambulance services through a combination of Health Authorities and Fire 
Departments (Health Quality Council of Alberta 2013). As previously stated, Ontario land 
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ambulance delivery is the responsibility of municipalities, designated by the Province 
(Ambulance Act R.S.O 1990). 
Ontario has 55 designated land ambulance services. These services are delivered in the following 
models; 
 Counties with separated cities (13) 
 Two-tier municipalities, delivered by the Upper-Tier (11) 
 Northern district social services boards (10) 
 Single tier municipalities (8) 
 Indigenous leadership within designated Indian Reserves (6) 
 The regional municipality (6) 
 Two separated cities, where one is designated the CMSM (1) 
In this study, focus will be paid on counties containing separated cities. In each of the 13 
services covering counties with separated cities, one of the municipalities has been designated 
the CMSM for land ambulance services. It is not consistent who the designated CMSM is 
between the county or the separated city. In Guelph-Wellington for example, Guelph is the 
designated agent. Whereas in Frontenac-Kingston, Frontenac County administers land 
ambulance service. Further complicating this is the delivery model chosen by the CMSM. In 
Middlesex-London, Middlesex County has formed an ambulance special-purpose board (SPB) to 
deliver service. Of the remaining 12 services, three are delivered through contracting service 
delivery, with the balance delivered directly by the municipality. 
This paper seeks to measure the relative accountability of land ambulance services, provided 
in Ontario under CMSM agreements. To accomplish this, the paper will use a modified 
Governance Assessment Tool (GAT) to operationalize the performance of each ambulance 
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service included in the study. What follows the qualitative section is a case comparison between 
Middlesex-London Paramedic Service (MLPS) and Essex-Windsor Emergency Medical Services 
(EWEMS). By using a modified GAT to quantitatively measure these inter-municipal 
relationships, and by comparing the various models delivered in this group, predictors of strong 
performance can be sought. What’s more, taking these predictors and examining case examples 
will further support the GAT findings. 
This paper intends to further strengthen the academic literature on CMSM agreements, vital 
municipal service delivery, and the GAT as a tool for measuring. It also aims to inform 
municipalities who are charged with the responsibility for land ambulance delivery in Ontario, 
by providing predictors of a strong framework for accountability. Through quantitative and case 
analysis, this work finds that there is variation, consistent with previous research (Spicer 2017; 
Lyons and Spicer 2018) in the so-called “accountability and transparency gap” (Spicer 2017, pp. 
389) across the 13 land ambulance services studied. Additionally, that this variation has 
identifiable characteristics, easily deployed by municipalities, that predict strong democratic 
performance in accountability.  
CHAPTER 2 - REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.1  Accountability 
 
Accountability is broadly defined as an “obligation to answer for the performance of duties” 
(Badie et al. 2011, pp. 1). For this paper, I will be considering political accountability. Political 
accountability is generally regarded as a symbol of representative democracy, requiring those 
exercising the public’s authority to be evaluated (Spicer 2017). The so-called principal-agent 
relationship, where the principal is the voter and the agent is the elected official or administrative 
staff member (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012; Lyons 2020). Fearon described this as, “person 
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A is accountable to another, B, if two conditions are met. First, there is an understanding that A 
is obligated to act in some way on behalf of B. Second, B is empowered by some formal 
institution or perhaps informal rules to sanction or reward A for her activities or performance in 
this capacity” (1999, pp. 55). After all, accountability has no power or authority without a system 
of rewards or enforcement (Lyons 2020). 
Research by Ebrahim and Weisband, extrapolate accountability to four components; 
transparency, answerability, compliance, and enforcement (2007). Where information must be 
collected and made public for scrutiny. Actions or inactions must then be justified through 
reasoning for questioning. Evaluation of procedures and outcomes findings must be reported, 
where the application of sanctions may be imposed for shortcomings (Ebrahim and Weisband 
2007; Spicer 2017). 
While there have been significant amounts of research on political accountability, much of 
this work has been completed at the provincial and federal levels of government (Arnbuckle 
2018). Where there have been studies looking at municipal level accountability, most of it has 
been done in the context of the United States (Breux and Couture 2018).  
Canadian municipal context has been accumulating in recent years and helps to provide some 
basis for this paper. In 2014, scholar Sancton’s analysis of municipal elections demonstrated 
“that the conventional model (principal-agent) for such accountability involves attentive voters 
informed…about the actions of local elected members of council. It is easy to see how this 
model fails…it was difficult for voters to monitor the actions of their local non-partisan council” 
(2018, pp. 146). Voters reinforce mechanisms of accountability since they are able to judge the 
government based on the implementation of electoral promises (Breux and Couture 2018). 
Further, Spicer added to the Canadian empirical evidence when he measured accountability and 
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transparency with inter-municipal service agreements (2017). Spicer concludes that these 
agreements score poorly in part due to public access measures, and states that “holding agents to 
account requires a supply of information” (2017, pp. 391). Putting these concepts together, 
Arnbuckle explores accountability through the Ontario Integrity Commissioner, where among 
other findings reveals “[the] lack of information at the municipal level reoccurs as the theme in 
the overall ability for the municipal voter to hold politicians to account” (2018, pp. 8). 
Interestingly, in 2020, Lyons explores accountability for Canadian Special Purpose Boards 
(SPBs). He concludes that although information is often more available to voters (Lyons and 
Spicer 2018), sanctions can be difficult to apply as SPBs are further removed from their line of 
sight (Lyons 2020). 
Accountability is an interchange of information, dialogue, and rewards/sanctions (Brandsma 
and Schillemans 2012). However, what many researchers have found is ultimately a lack of 
information being provided to the principal/voter (Spicer 2017; Sancton 2018; Arnbuckle 2018). 
When information is available, such as the case for SPBs, rewards, and sanctions can be difficult 
to apply (Lyons 2020). From these findings, this paper will continue to build on the literature that 
attempts to measure accountability in the Canadian municipal context, using land ambulance 
service agreements. 
2.2  Special Purpose Boards (SPBs) 
 
When the term government is used, the first thing that often comes to people’s minds is 
national, state, and perhaps municipal governments. Rarely do people think about SPBs (Lyons 
2020) even though conservative estimations suggest that there are approximately 8,000 SPBs 
across Canada (Richmond and Siegel 1994; Tindal and Tindal 2004; Sancton 2015; Lyons 2020). 
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Despite being extremely common, they are often less visible than general-purpose governments 
(Sancton 2015).  
The question of what SPBs are and why they exist requires further discussion. First, it should 
be noted that significant variation in how SPBs can be formed (Sanction 2015; Lyons 2020) 
exists. However, for the purposes of this paper, it will be limited to the Canadian context. Within 
Canada, the formation of SPBs is limited to federal and provincial governments, as well as 
municipalities (Richmond and Siegel 1994; Lyons 2015).  SPBs are very similar to local 
governments, however, they are limited to a single function or purpose (Siegel 1994a; Sancton 
2015; Lyons 2020). Examples of common SPBs are police or library boards.  Secondly, SPBs 
can be established across multiple jurisdictions (Sancton 2015), and are at times formed 
intentionally when multiple municipalities or levels of government are involved. 
Intergovernmental SPBs that a commonplace within the Canadian landscape is conservation 
authorities. As Sancton notes, “institutions have generally been designed to help solve real 
problems in the real world rather than to look neat on an organizational chart” (2015, pp.45). 
This is true of conservation authorities where jurisdictional boundaries are decided based upon 
watersheds, rather than municipal boundaries (Sancton 2015). Similarly, other scholars have 
noted that SPBs are designed “around the geography of the problem” (Hooghe and Marks 2003; 
Lyons 2020, pp. 145). 
Although there is limited study on SPBs, there has been much debate around the “democratic 
anchorage” of SPBs (Lyons 2020, pp.161). This is linked with the variation in board formation, 
between elected and non-elected actors (Sancton 2015). Further, the debate concerning SPBs 
between polycentrists and consolidationists is ongoing (Lyons 2015). Polycentrists argue for 
cross-jurisdictional, functionally specialized institutions, where consolidationists prefer single, 
16 
 
large general-purpose governments (Mullin 2009; Lyons 2015). With the focus of this paper 
being accountability within Ontario land ambulance services, which provide service to counties 
with separated cities, the scope of the literature review will set aside the polycentrist and 
consolidationist debate. Rather, further exploration into the literature of inter-local/governmental 
SPBs was completed. 
The use of SPBs for service delivery is increasing, despite the lack of scholarly study into 
SPBs and inter-local agreements (Lyons and Spicer 2018). Perhaps one of the reasons for the 
increase in SPBs for service delivery can be explained by the work of Siegel who provides 
factors for determining whether or not to deliver service through SPB (1994b). These factors are 
“the need for multi-jurisdictional service area, intergovernmental coordination, organizational 
flexibility, and arm’s-length decision-making (Siegel 1994b). These findings were supported by 
Lyons when he concludes that SPBs who work across multiple jurisdictions, fulfill their mandate 
better than SPBs within single governments (Lyons 2015). 
Looking at the land ambulance sector within Ontario, many ambulance services provide care 
to multiple municipalities. For a majority of these ambulance services, the circumstances 
described by Siegel are not factors within the municipality designated as responsible for service 
delivery. Examples of this are single-tier or two-tier systems, regional governments, and 
Indigenous Indian Reserves. However, for counties with separated cities and Northern District 
Services Boards, Siegel’s circumstances are present and the question about the value of SPBs 
should be considered. Within the scope of this paper, studying the 13 land ambulance services in 
counties with separated cities, one service has formed an SPB – MLPS. 




The ability to connect rural and urban areas continues to challenge provincial and municipal 
policy makers due to the realities of economic and physical geography (Sweet 1999; Spicer 
2016). As a result, both distinctive areas were provincially granted institutions for governance, 
which further cemented their uniqueness and divide (Spicer 2016). “City-county separation was 
the original method of organizing municipalities in the Province of Ontario” (Spicer 2014, 
pp.245) and is a structure that continues today within the province (Spicer 2015). Despite these 
institutional and geographical differences throughout Ontario, Provincial policy requires that all 
444 municipalities (Lyons 2020) work together to deliver services deemed to be partially or 
wholly the responsibility of local governments (Graham and Phillips 1998; Spicer 2015). 
How municipalities in Ontario work together is largely based upon their local governance 
structures. Ontario examples include single-tier municipalities, regional governments, two-tier 
systems, or the aforementioned city-county scenarios. Regardless of the local circumstances, 
Ontario introduced the Consolidated Municipal Services Manger system, as a means for 
designating the responsibility for service delivery to one municipality (Spicer 2015). These 
CMSM designations that were introduced in 1998 also included the responsibility for partial 
funding of these services (Spicer 2015). This in effect, was the Provincial government's method 
of realigning provincial services and downloading financial and oversight responsibilities to the 
municipal governments, as part of their “Common Sense Revolution” election promises (Graham 
and Phillips 1998; Spicer 2014, 2015). 
With the implementation of the CMSM program, the result for many areas, such as regional 
or two-tier municipalities, was a very clear and sensible pathway (Spicer 2014) to “who does 
what” (Graham and Phillips 1998). However, this was not the case for city-county communities, 
where analysis demonstrated variation in how CMSM arrangements would be decided (Spicer 
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2015). “Unlike other municipalities in the province, the [Provincial] government did not provide 
guidelines for how separated cities and counties would divide related costs and 
responsibilities…[leading] in some cases, multiple CMSM agreements to cover [all] policy 
responsibilities” (Spicer 2014, pp. 250). Suddenly, municipalities separated by design were 
foisted into service partnerships. What’s more, these service responsibilities under the Local 
Services Realignment (Ontario 1999), were important and indeed expensive services to deliver 
(Spicer 2014), including social services and land ambulance (Ontario 1998a; Prno 2002). 
The study into CMSM agreements is very limited, likely due to their uniqueness within 
Ontario. However, what has been studied is the prevalence of these agreements, which 
demonstrates that while city-county relationships scarcely use formal inter-municipal 
agreements, the majority of agreements in place are CMSMs (Spicer 2014). Further, studies have 
demonstrated that the unique city-county separation within Ontario posed a hindrance to the 
implementation of the CMSM program, leading to local frustration and costly arbitrations 
(Spicer 2015). Finally, empirical research has been conducted on the accountability and 
transparency of inter-municipal agreements and SPBs, of which some form part of the CMSM 
program (Spicer 2017; Lyons and Spicer 2018). 
In sum, CMSMs were implemented by the Province of Ontario as a mechanism for 
downloading services to municipalities. While these agreements are commonplace provincially, 
they are not well studied (Spicer 2015). There is a further paucity of literature where CMSM 
agreements meet city-county separation, where governance structures appear to improve the 
accountability of inter-local cooperation (Lyons and Spicer 2018). 




There has been longstanding interest in measuring and analyzing the performance of public 
agencies (Boyne 2006). This is particularly true when it comes to cooperative service 
agreements, as researchers have described an indistinct line of accountability whenever a single 
government is not solely responsible for service delivery (Lyons and Spicer 2018). As previously 
mentioned, the practice of inter-governmental and inter-local cooperation agreements is 
increasing (Spicer 2015). What’s more, the types of services that are being cooperatively 
delivered, such as emergency protection, are important (Spicer 2017). Formal agreements for this 
service delivery are normally established and described among other responsibilities, financial 
obligations (Andrew 2008, 2009). However, with such vital services being delivered in this 
manner, scholars need to understand the extent to which accountability is being impacted.  
To better measure the “accountability and transparency gap” (Spicer 2017, pp.389) with 
cooperation agreements, many researchers have made different attempts at this aim. 
Accountability is a challenging concept to empirically measure, largely related to the variability 
with governments and institutions (Lyons and Spicer 2018). Some scholars have attempted to 
measure accountability expectations (Wang 2002), the degree to which levied sanctions have 
enforced standards (Henretty and Koop 2011), and studies into mapping accountability networks 
(Brandsma and Schillemans 2012). However, in recent years, a modified Governance 
Assessment Tool (GAT) has been used in the Ontario local government context to build 
empirical evidence concerning such cooperative agreements, as well as their related governance 
structures. 
Originally developed by Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith (2005), the GAT was operationalized 
to measure the democratic performance of various public services through cooperative 
agreements in the United Kingdom. While all agreements are committed to delivering service to 
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the public, not all delivery agents are as committed to their democratic performance (Lyons and 
Spicer 2018). Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith implemented their GAT to provide empirical data, 
measuring the degree of accountability and transparency. The original tool (see Table 2.1) 
comprised of criteria for public access internal governance, member conduct, and external 
accountability. All of which was determined to be a basic and achievable framework for 
accountability (Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith 2005; Lyons and Spicer 2018). If we return to the 
conceptualization by Ebrahim and Weisband on accountability (2007), the GAT provides 
critique for criteria concerning; transparency, answerability, compliance, and enforcement 
(Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith 2005; Ebrahim and Weisband 2007). 
Table 2.1 
 
Governance Assessment Criteria 
  
A. Public Access 
1. Are meetings of the board advertised? 
2. Are meetings of the board open to the press and public? 
3. Are the public entitled to see reports considered by the board? 
4. 
Are the reports that the board will consider available for the public to consult prior to the 
meeting? 
5. Are the public entitled to see minutes of the board meetings? 
6. Is there an annual general meeting that the public can attend? 
B. Internal Governance 
1. 
Does the partnership have a memorandum of association or other document defining its role 
and powers? 
2. 
Does the partnership have a written constitution or set of standing orders defining how it will 
conduct business at meetings? 
3. Is membership for a limited period of time? 
4. Does a quorum apply at board meetings? 
5. Are written minutes of board meetings produced? 
6. Are there allowances or other payments for members? 
C. Member Conduct 
1. Is there a code of conduct to regulate the behaviour of members at board meetings? 
2. If there is a code, are board members required to agree to be bound by it? 
3. Is there a register in which board members detail their financial and other interests? 
4. Is there a system for declaring conflicts of interest at meetings? 
5. 
Is there a procedure for ensuring that members declaring conflicts of interest take no part in 
the decision? 
D. Accountability 
1. Does the partnership have to prepare an annual report? 
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2. Does the partnership have to prepare an annual budget? 
3. Does the partnership have to prepare annual accounts? 
4. Is the partnership subject to external audit? 
5. Is the partnership subject to external inspection? 
6. Is there a complaints process available to citizens or service users? 
7. Is the partnership under the jurisdiction of an ombudsmen or inspectorate? 
8. Is the partnership required to meet targets agreed with any other bodies? 
9. Does the partnership take a formal report to any other bodies? 
10. Can members be recalled by their nominating bodies? 
  
Source: Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith (2005) 
 
What is of particular help in answering the research question of this paper, is the modified 
GAT (Lyons 2014; Spicer 2017; Lyons and Spicer 2018). The need for a modification by 
Canadian researchers (see table 3.2) was a result of the nature of municipal agreements within 
Ontario, which are often are less complex than the original partnerships studied in the United 
Kingdom (Spicer 2017). What follows in the Canadian context are three studies which 
demonstrate overall poor accountability and transparency with inter-municipal service 
partnerships, with improved performance in these agreements when an SPB governance structure 
is in place (Lyons 2014; Spicer 2017; Lyons and Spicer 2018). It is expected that this study will 
find similar conclusions to these Canadian analyses. Ideally, further adding to the empirical data 
on SPBs and inter-municipal agreements, while providing the new context of CMSM agreements 
in counties with separated cities. 
CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Aim and Question 
The review of the above literature provides an overall context as it relates to accountability 
with CMSM agreements, and how governance structures affect accountability in inter-local 
agreements more broadly. Additionally, this review highlights the gaps where further study can 
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be targeted in order to add empirical evidence to both the data on Ontario’s city-county CMSM 
agreements and SPBs.  
With the commonality of CMSM agreements throughout Ontario and the uniqueness of city-
county separation, the incentive to study this relatively unexplored area clear. Does the 
combination of such agreements and these institutions hold up to a test of accountability? 
Generally, this research aims to better understand these ideas, and provide both scholars and 
practitioners with more evidence to guide future policy in this area. 
As previously presented in the literature review, accountability matters. It is a hallmark of 
our democratic governments (Spicer 2017). In the end, citizens want to know that the services 
being provided are visible to them and that they have the ability to act if they are pleased or 
dissatisfied with those services. This is particularly true when it comes to services that people 
depend on during an emergency. 
Vital services, such as land ambulance, are being delivered under CMSM agreements every 
day throughout Ontario. This knowledge, along with the knowledge of the previously described 
work on inter-local agreements and their effect on accountability, is critical that researchers aim 
to explore the extent to which the accountability of vital services are affected by these 
agreements. 
The research question is therefore; In areas where city-county institutions are established, to 
what extent is the accountability gap in land ambulance services agreements affected by the 
governance model of the service provider?  
3.2 Case Selection 
Within the province of Ontario, there are 55 designated land ambulances, providing care 
across all 444 municipalities. However, the scope of this project is intended to measure the 
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CMSM agreements that are in place within communities that have city-county separation. 
Therefore, for the GAT analysis portion of the study, the units of analysis will be the 13 land 
ambulance services that meet these criteria. These services are listed in the table below (table 
3.1); 
Table 3.1  








Despite the limited number of cases meeting the scope of this project, there is good variation 
in governance models and service delivery. Of the 13, one CMSM has established an SPB for 
service delivery (Middlesex County). With the remaining 12, three are involved in some degree 
of contracting-out (Elgin, Lanark, and Perth). Further, there is some variation in the number of 
municipalities involved in each CMSM, from two to four municipalities.  
For the next portion of this paper, a comparative case study analysis of a purposive sample of 
two land ambulance services within Ontario will be undertaken using a cross-sectional 
(snapshot) nested (mixed approached) research design. For this case selection, Middlesex-
London’s land ambulance service is the first case selected as it is the only land ambulance 
service governed by an SPB. In order to better understand how the SPB affects accountability 
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(dependent variable), it must be compared with a case where the municipality does not have an 
SPB. To control for other variables, a land ambulance service with otherwise most similar 
characteristics must be sought, in an attempt to best isolate the governance structure 
(independent variable). For this purpose, Essex-Windsor-Pelee poses as a good comparator for 
Middlesex-London. Most similar in population size, urban-rural ratio, large Ontario University 
and College populations, and where both designated CMSM agents are the county 
municipalities. Further, despite the small separated township of Pelee within Essex-Windsor, 
both land-ambulance services provide care to one large rural upper-tier municipality and one 
large separated city.  
3.3 Data Sources 
3.3.1 Governance Assessment Tool Analysis 
The main source of data that was used to inform the completion of the GAT is the 13 CMSM 
agreements themselves. All agreements are publically available as they are passed municipally, as by-
laws. These documents were used to answer many of the criteria within the GAT, specifically those 
pertaining to the domains of public access and internal governance.  
To further aid the completion of the GAT, websites for the paramedic services and their 
associated municipalities were used. This proves to be a great source of information, as this 
information helps to inform the GAT domains of public access and accountability. Further, it is 
similarly available to the public.  
Combined, the agreements and website information are an eloquent way for this paper to 
give me a similar sense of what is readily accessible to the public. Relying on this accessible 
information gives a “fair” indication of what residents might expect for land ambulance service 
information, which by nature of the GAT, belongs in the public sphere (Lyons and Spicer 2018). 
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3.3.2 Case Study Analysis 
Information sources used to inform the two case reviews primarily comes from secondary 
sources, such as council reports, CMSM agreements, media reports, Statistics Canada, municipal 
website, and land ambulance service websites. The information on the two cases bolsters the GAT 
findings, as well as informs how these agreements are working in practice. 
3.4 Operationalizing Concepts 
For this project, the researcher employs a positivist research ontology to quantitatively 
test (hypothesis) and describe (what) the variations in accountability (Dependent Variable) 
between city-county ambulance services, with different governance structures (Independent 
Variable). It uses a deductive research strategy that has a mixed-method (nested) approach. The 
paper first quantifies the extent of accountability in 13 city-county services, confirming broader 
theoretical knowledge and previous quantitative findings. Secondly, using a comparative case 
study, the paper employs a purposive selection and qualitatively describes the findings in two 
similar municipalities. These findings of these municipalities, with separate governance 
structures, support the GAT findings. 
3.4.1 Governance Assessment Tool Analysis 
In order to operationalize this study and measure the extent of accountability in 13 city-
county services, the GAT was used.   
As previously described, the GAT was originally provided by Skelcher, Mathur, and 
Smith (2005) was subsequently adapted by several researchers. Each looking at quantitative 
studies of accountability and/or transparency in inter-governmental partnerships (Skelcher, 
Mathur, and Smith 2005; Lyons 2014; Spicer 2017; Lyons and Spicer 2018). The need for 
Canadian researchers Spicer and Lyons to adapt the original tool was a result of the nature of 
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municipal agreements within Ontario, which Spicer described as “often less complex than the 
original partnerships studied in the United Kingdom” by Skelcher et al (2017, pp. 394). 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this study being conducted within the Ontario context, the 
modified GAT was selected.  
Similar to the Canadian adaptations of the GAT, the scoring range from 0 to 1 (1 if a 
criterion is met, 0.5 if partially met and 0 if not met) is used to measure and compare 
accountability relationships (Lyons 2014; Spicer 2017). The GAT provides a score for each 
criterion within three larger domains; public access, internal governance, and accountability. For 
the study by Spicer (2017), these three domains each contained 5 criteria, allowing for a possible 
score of 15 for each agreement. The original criteria included by Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith 
(2005) had a possible score of 27 (see table 2.1). 
For the purposes of this study, the modified tool used by Spicer (2017) was further 
modified to include three further criteria (see table 3.2), felt to be relevant to the context of land 
ambulance service delivery and to provide clearer detail for analysis.  
Table 3.2 
 
Modified Governance Assessment Criteria 
  
A. Public Access 
1. Are agreements available to the public? 
2. Are provisions made to have public meetings? 
3. Are the public entitled to see reports regarding performance? 
4. Is a contact provided in the agreement? 
5. Are the public entitled to see minutes of meetings? 
B. Internal Governance 
1. Does the agreement define specific roles for each partner? 
2. Are meetings scheduled? 
3. Are there written standards for communication? 
4. Are there written standards for budgeting? 
5. Do all municipalities have a voice through board/committee? 
6. Are written meetings minutes required? 
C. Accountability 
1. Does the partnership have to prepare an annual report? 
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2. Does the partnership have to prepare an annual budget? 
3. Is the 2020 detailed approved budget available? 
4. Is the partnership subject to external audit? 
5. Is there a complaints process available to citizens or service users? 
6. Does the partnership describe who represents each community? 
7. Does the partnership describe who is financially responsible for service delivery? 
  
Adapted 
from: Spicer (2017) 
 
The added criteria were; 
B5 – This question was added in order to better inform the research question. The question aims 
to determine if governance structures affect the degree of accountability. Variations in this 
criterion represent the extent of accountability that elected officials of municipalities who are not 
designated the CMSM maintain for their communities.  
C3 – This question was added to separate municipalities that were providing timely information 
to their residents. This represents how forthcoming the municipality is with providing financial 
information and serves as a snap-shot audit for municipalities not consistently providing 
important information to their community. 
C5 – Originally found in the work of Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith (2005), this question was felt 
to be very relevant for a service as important to the community as land ambulance. Further, as 
accountability was described above, the ability to readily provide positive or negative feedback 
represents an important link in the chain of accountability. 
In sum, this GAT provides the ability to remain consistent with previous studies in 
Ontario, adding both external validity to the results of this study, as well as additional empirical 
evidence to the body of work in this area.  
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Following the completion of scoring using the above framework (see table 3.2), the 
scores within each domain are tallied, then divided by their total possible score. The result is each 
agreement receiving a score from 0.001 to 1.0 for each domain. Additionally, the sum of all criteria 
was tallied and divided by the total possible score (18). These results were expressed from 0.01 to 
1.0 for each agreement. Finally, the average score for each domain and the average overall score 
were calculated. 
The results were analyzed looking for comparisons between domain scores, against the 
average. Where variation from the average was noted, results of the individual criterion were 
reviewed, looking for trends that provided insight into better domain performance. Additionally, 
total scores were compared with the average, and where variation was noted, results of the domains 
were reviewed, looking for domain trends of overall performance. Overall, the evaluation of the 
domains and total score help to infer the correlation between governance structure and 
accountability performance. 
3.4.2 Case Study Analysis 
The units of analysis (two similar land ambulance services with different governance 
structures) will be operationalized by utilizing a qualitative review, determining through 
description how each agreement is working out in practice.  
The process includes reviewing the GAT findings in detail for both cases, looking 
specifically where one outperforms the other. Then reviewing these findings, bolstered by theory 
and supported by practice, explain the findings of strong and poor performance. The focus on 
these findings is linked to their models of governance. 
The combination of qualitative findings anchored in the empirical GAT scores will be 
used to support the paper's hypotheses that: 
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1. When measuring accountability in city-counties institutions, most cases will generally 
perform poorly, but; 
2. In a county with a separated city where an authority board has been established to deliver 
land ambulance service, this municipality will demonstrate better quantifiable 
performance, and; 
3. That these quantitative findings will be supported by a case study review in two selected 
cases. 
 
CHAPTER 4 - PRESENTATION OF GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT (GAT) TOOL 
FINDINGS 
In total, all 13 agreements were located and reviewed. Additionally, in each case following 
the agreement review, the websites of each municipality involved in the agreements were 
reviewed, looking to inform the GAT. The final scores for each agreement, listed by the 
ambulance service name, are provided in table (4.1) below.  
Table 4.1 
 
 Modified Governance Assessment Criteria 



















    
Cornwall 2 0.8 1.0 0.786 0.86 
Elgin 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.53 
Essex-Windsor 3 1.0 0.667 0.857 0.83 
Frontenac-
Kingston 2 
1.0 0.667 0.786 0.81 
Guelph-
Wellington 2 
0.8 0.833 0.857 0.83 
Hastings 3 1.0 1.0 0.857 0.94 





0.8 1.0 0.571 0.77 
Middlesex-
London 2 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Perth 3 0.7 1.0 0.786 0.83 
Peterborough 2 1.0 1.0 0.857 0.94 
Renfrew 2 1.0 1.0 0.786 0.92 
Simcoe 3 1.0 1.0 0.857 0.89 
      
Average Score  0.885 0.987 0.786 0.843 
      
No colour represents direct delivery by the designated CMSM 
Blue represents some degree of contracted service delivery 
Orange represents delivery through SPB 
  
4.1 Public Access Performance 
The domain of public access demonstrates generally strong performance. Despite the 
variation from 0.5 to 1.0, the average for this domain score is 0.885.  
These findings are overall not consistent with Spicer's previous study (2017). In his study, 
the overall performance in public access was by contrast, very poor. At the time, this was 
attributed to the challenges faced with obtaining the agreements with ease, or at all. In that study, 
however, there were a total of 132 agreements reviewed (Spicer 2017) and were across multiple 
sectors of service delivery. In this study, all 13 agreements were obtained. The only noted 
variation on this was partial scores (0.5), which were given to those services that have a full or 
partial model of contracted delivery. This was due to the fact that the CMSM agreements were 
available to the public, but agreements for the contracted service were not. This is not surprising 
given the allowances for non-disclosure under the Ontario Municipal Act (Municipal Act SO 
2001). 
Another finding noted on three agreements that affected the performance in this domain was 
a lack of contact information for a designated individual at each municipality on the agreements. 
This finding seems less consequential as the parties involved in the agreement are all clearly 
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identified. These findings were all noted in services that are delivered directly by the 
municipality.  
Interestingly, in two cases, partial scores were deducted for public meetings and minutes. 
This was noted in both a direct-delivery and contracted model. In both cases, this was the result 
of evidence that a subcommittee exists to discuss ambulance service provision, but these 
meetings did not yield evidence of public access, nor minutes of their proceedings. In both cases, 
however, there was evidence of ambulance decisions being made at Municipal Council, which 
was open to the public, with provided minutes. 
Seven agreements satisfied all the domain requirements of public access. Six of which were 
direct-delivery, with one being the only SPB service. An important component of ensuring that 
the public can hold local governments accountable is access to information (Justice, Melitski, 
and Smith 2006). 
Slack (1993, 1997) states that citizens ought to know who they pay for service, and who they 
can hold accountable for that service. In general, most of the agreements perform well in the 
public access domain, with the strongest performances from direct and SPB delivery. Contracted 
delivery suffers the most, given the lack of publically available information on the service 
contract. 
4.2 Internal Governance Performance 
The domain of internal governance also demonstrates generally strong performance. It too 
has variation from 0.5 to 1.0, with an average for this domain score of a solid 0.897.  
In all but four of the 13 agreements reviewed score a complete 1.0 in this entire domain. For 
those four that did not, they commonly saw their deductions coming from the added B5 question 
“Do all municipalities have a voice through a board/committee?”. This cohort included three 
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direct-delivery and one contracted delivery model. As previously stated, variations in this 
criterion represent the extent of accountability that elected officials of municipalities not 
designated the CMSM maintain for their communities. The scope of this project does not extend 
into research regarding authorization, but there remain issues of accountability when there is no 
elected official providing oversight or input into the service being delivered. Ultimately, voters 
elect their representatives and have the ability to sanction them for their performance, as part of 
the requirements for accountability (Fearon 1999; Ebrahim and Weisband 2007). However, when 
elected officials play no role in the oversight of the service being provided, the ability to sanction 
does not exist.  
Further performance gaps were noted in particular with a contracted delivery model and 
included no defined meeting schedule or standard by which to communicate between 
municipalities.  
Generally, all agreements performed well across this domain, with an average of 0.897. Of 
note, the SPB delivery scores a complete 1.0, along with eight other ambulance services that 
included direct and contracted delivery. Those that performed well all had either a joint 
subcommittee or authority board that provides representation to the municipalities receiving 
service, not designated the CMSM. 
4.3 Accountability Performance 
The domain of accountability is where performance appears to suffer on average (0.786), 
with consistent variation from 0.5 to 1.0. This demonstrates that there are wider variations in 
municipalities' commitment to ensuring transparency with service performance, by leaving the 
community with not enough information by which to form a judgement on the service they are 
receiving (Lyons and Spicer 2018). 
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This domain is created as a means to provide insight into the ability for sanctions to be 
placed upon the principal, within the accountability relationship (Brandsma and Schillemans 
2012; Lyons and Spicer 2018). This becomes evident when reviewing the components of this 
domain, with only one ambulance service creating a formal annual report. Of the remaining 12, 
one provides some detail to the CMSM municipality’s annual report, while the other 11 provide 
no annual reporting. This lack of consolidated information makes it difficult for the community 
to have insight into the service that has been provided, form a cost-for-service analysis, and 
ultimately sanction their decision-makers. The only service that does release an annual report, 
was the SPB. This may be the result of the arms-length relationship that the SPB has with the 
municipality, as it is not uncommon to see SPBs, like police services, release annual reports 
(London Police Services Board 2021) to their community and municipal councils alike. 
What’s more, only five of the services had a direct complaints process advertised on the 
service website. This clear pathway for citizens to provide negative feedback is important in 
demonstrating to the public that you are a service for them, and want to know when the mark is 
missed. The eight remaining agreements were given partial scores as they all demonstrated 
general inquiries contact information or instructions. This “laissez-faire” approach however does 
not provide the same degree of assurance or clarity to the community that the service level being 
provided is important, and how to provide feedback when it does not live up to their 
expectations. Of the five that did satisfy the clear complaints process, four were direct-delivery 
with the fifth being the SPB. 
Other noteworthy findings were that three services did not provide a clear and detailed 2020 
approved budget. Of these three, two were contract delivery models. In one of these cases, a total 
dollar figure is available within the municipal budget, however, the details and breakdown of that 
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spending were unavailable. In the other, no financial figures were readily available through the 
service or county websites. 
With such variation in performance across this domain, it was noted that those who 
performed best were able to demonstrate a clear complaints process, detailed budget information 
and in one case, an annual report that highlights the service performance. It should be noted that 
in five services, the simple addition of such a complaints process and by releasing an annual 
report would bring their performance to a 1.0, where the SPB performs. The SPBs performance 
in this domain demonstrates its commitment to providing the community with enough 
information for them to form a judgement and to levy sanctions, thereby satisfying the 
accountability relationship (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012; Lyons and Spicer 2018). 
4.4  Summative Scores 
 
Having multiple municipalities in the chain of accountability reduces the transparency for the 
public (Alcantara, Spicer, and Leone 2012). While the performance of land ambulance services 
using the GAT is better than the scores observed in previous Ontario-based research (Spicer 
2017), there is still variation in the overall performance across the 13 agreements and ambulance 
services studied. The total scores ranged from 0.53 to 1.0. The average overall score was 0.836.  
When considering the research question, which considers the governance model, the 
following table (see table 4.2) details the overall average performance based upon the delivery 
model. 
Table 4.2   
Delivery Model 
Number of 
CMSMs Average Score 
     
Full or Partial Contracting 3 0.694 
Special Purpose Board 9 0.867 




It is clear by breaking down the delivery models that accountability performance changes 
based upon the model chosen. It should be noted that the sample size for these models is small 
overall, with significantly more direct delivery than contracting or SPB. It does, however, 
generally find that direct and SPB perform significantly better than contracted delivery. In the 
conclusion, further comparison of the SPB and direct-delivery will be explored. 
CHAPTER 5 - DISCUSSION AND CASE STUDY 
5.1  Discussion 
With the completion of the GAT analysis, it is beneficial to look at a real-life case 
comparison to determine if the GAT findings were consistent in two land-ambulance services 
within Ontario. Further, by purposefully selecting the most similar cases whose only distinct 
difference is that of the governance model, helps to strengthen previous studies' findings that 
governance models have an impact on accountability in the real world. 
5.2  Introduction of Case Study 
As mentioned, this brief case analysis aims to better understand the findings in this study's 
GAT analysis as well as those of previous work on governance models. To accomplish this 
qualitative analysis, a most similar cases approach is completed. The one notable difference, 
however, is the delivery model of the land-ambulance service. 
There has been a significant amount of previous studies on the democratic performance 
related to contract delivery (Breton 1996; Found 2012; Slack and Bird 2013), so it is not the 
intention of this paper to focus too much on contract delivery. Further, the decisions around 
determine a desire to contract out are often related to factors around efficiency, and not of 
accountability. Therefore, this case study looks to compare SPB and direct delivery. 
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What follows are two case examples of Ontario land-ambulance services. One of which is 
delivered by an SPB (Middlesex-London Paramedic Service), and the other by direct delivery 
(Essex-Windsor Emergency Medical Services). The first case described is Middlesex-London 
Paramedic Service, which will outline the community it serves, who the designated CMSM is, 
and some findings of the Service as it relates to the criterion of the GAT. Descriptions of 
challenges noted in the media will be explored, along with barriers to the governance model. 
Following that, Essex-Windsor Emergency Medical Services will be similarly outlined and 
described, with attention to compare and contrast with the findings in Middlesex-London. 
5.2.1 Middlesex-London Paramedic Service 
Located in southwestern Ontario, Middlesex County and the City of London are roughly 
near the midpoint of Detroit and Toronto (Lyons and Spicer 2018). London was incorporated as 
a city and separated from Middlesex County in 1855 (Spicer 2016). Since then, London has been 
involved in many annexations of the surrounding counties (Sancton 1998; Spicer 2016). Despite 
this significant growth over the 160 years, the city continues to be linked to Middlesex County 
through inter-local and CMSM agreements. 
Geographically, the city-county region has 455,526 residents and covers 3,317.27 square 
kilometers (Statistics Canada 2017b). The average 2015 household income was $83,802, and the 
2021 approved land-ambulance budget for MLPS was $46,864,128 (London 2021).  
The designated CMSM for land-ambulance is the County of Middlesex, which in October 
2011 was created through a by-law the Middlesex London Emergency Medical Services 
Authority (MLEMSA), known as Middlesex-London Paramedic Service (MLPS) (London 
2011a). In its original formation, voting members included Middlesex County councilors and the 
County Chief Administrative Officer (London 2011b).  
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In 2020, the City of London raised concerns about the lack of board representation and 
data being provided by the SPB to the city (London 2020a; Newcombe 2020). The concerns 
raised about data were largely dismissed as the SPB releases an annual report through County 
Council (Middlesex-London Paramedic Service 2020). However, the charge of board 
representation was cause for action, and in response to these concerns, the County of Middlesex 
amended the SPB composition to include elected representation from the City of London 
(London 2020b).  
When looking at the performance of MLPS’s SPB in the GAT, the agreement/land-
ambulance service score a complete 18 points out of a possible 18 (see table 4.1). These findings 
would have been poorer, had the GAT been completed prior to the change in board composition, 
when the City of London was permitted Council representation. This proves to be an important 
step forward in improving the SPBs overall accountability.  
Crucial to the success in remaining accountability, the MLEMSA board holds public 
meetings, with publically available agendas and minutes. Further, due to the SPBs arms-length 
relationship with the County, MLPS presents an annual report and a detailed budget to both the 
City and County, once approved by the SPB. 
One of the design features of the MLEMSA board is that it does not have the authority to 
levy taxes directly, and must receive budget approval from Middlesex County (London 2021). 
This differentiates itself from common SPBs, such as police and public health boards, who have 
independent abilities to levy taxes (Sancton 2015). This ensures that elected officials maintain 
authority over the budget and taxation. Whether by design or not, this feature does improve 
accountability and prevents the frequent criticism of SPBs, that they are a step removed from the 
electoral process (Lyons 2020).  
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When Lyons and Spicer examined SPBs and inter-municipal agreements in London, they 
concluded that “SPBs perform much better than inter-local agreements, and some SPBs perform 
much better than others” (2018, pp. 192). They note that SPBs who performed better were those 
that provided a large amount of access and information to the public (Lyons and Spicer 2018). 
This was because this information allows for the public more opportunity for scrutiny and to 
hold elected officials to account.  
When considering the local context of the MLEMSA, the findings of this study’s GAT, 
and the previous examinations of other researchers, the results appear to be consistent. MLPS 
performs well in the GAT because;  
 MLEMSA provides the public large amounts of data and information, and, 
 MLEMSA provides the partnering municipality a voice on the service provision through 
board representation, and, 
 MLEMSA holds public meetings with available agendas and minutes, and, 
 MLPS provides a clearly stated complaints process for residents and service users to 
submit concerns with service, and, 
 The County of Middlesex maintains the ultimate authority on budget and tax levy 
approvals. 
5.2.2 Essex-Windsor Emergency Medical Services 
Turning the focus nearly 200km down Ontario’s highway 401, I will now consider the city-
county community of the County of Essex, City of Windsor, and Pelee Island. Incorporated in 
1858 originally as Sandwich, Windsor has been separated from its surrounding rural counties 
since (Windsor 2021). Similar to London, the City of Windsor has continued to grow through 
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annexation but remains linked to neighbouring counties for municipal service delivery, namely 
the Province’s CMSM program. 
The first noted difference between these cases is the number of municipalities that are 
involved in the region’s CMSM agreements. While Essex County and the City of Windsor are 
joined by the Township of Pelee Island, the overall population and landmass, do not change the 
ability to compare these cases. The region has a population of 398,953 (Statistics Canada 2017a) 
and covers 1,850.90 square kilometers.  
The average 2015 household income was $85,824, and the 2021 approved land-
ambulance budget for EWEMS was $50,501,300 (Essex 2020).  
Since the introduction of the CMSM program in Ontario, the County of Essex has been 
the designated CMSM for land-ambulance, following a year-long arbitration process. The 
arbitration process was concerning the financial cost-sharing of services downloaded as part of 
the CMSM program (Rice 1999). Essex-Windsor Emergency Medical Services (EWEMS) was 
officially formed in 2001, and over the course of 8 years, took over service for pre-existing 
contracted land-ambulance providers to ultimately form a direct delivery model in 2009 (Duck 
2016). 
Following the arbitration, tensions were high as a result of merging the cultures by a 
forced city-county partnership (Spicer 2016; Duck 2016a). These tensions continued into 2016 
when local political debate went public over the land ambulance 2016 budget (Duck 2016a; 
2016b). These tensions may explain some of the GAT findings today, that cause EWEMS to 
suffer performance in accountability. 
Overall, EWEMS’s GAT score is average. It scores 15 points out of 18 (0.83) with the 
average total score for the 13 agreements being 0.836 (see table 4.1). The three points of 
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deduction mostly come from areas of internal governance, with partial deductions in 
accountability. 
When completing the GAT for EWEMS, neither the CMSM agreement nor website data 
provided a schedule of meetings (question B2) between partner municipalities, leaving the 
business of land-ambulance to be discussed as needed, at Essex County Council meetings. This 
finding was not common, as most CMSM agreements and other services provided a mechanism 
for meetings, even if ad hoc, between municipalities. This finding does not provide a clear forum 
for elected officials in Windsor or Pelee Island to bring service concerns forward to the CMSM, 
leading to potentially uncomfortable or informal discussions. 
The finding of scheduled meetings in combination with the lack of board or joint 
subcommittee (B5) may explain why tensions have historically been high between the 
municipalities. While the performance of the SPB was good in this regard, several other direct-
delivery and contracted services have established a joint committee. These official committees 
with elected representatives are crucial at maintaining accountability. This is especially true for 
the citizens of non-CMSM municipalities, who need an opportunity to sanction local 
representatives. In the case of Essex-Windsor-Pelee Island, residents of Windsor and Pelee 
Island have no apparent mechanism in ensuring their elected officials have a regular voice on 
service provisions. If a member of the Public in Windsor is unhappy with their land-ambulance 
service, their ability to sanction officials is non-existent.  
Finally, EWEMS loses partial marks for their general inquiry contact information and 
lack of identified complaints contact, as well as having limited information published within the 
Essex County annual report, rather than a stand-alone complete report. It should be noted 
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however that EWEMS is the only service to even go this far, besides the aforementioned 
MLEMSA.  
Overall, EWEMS performs well across the GAT. What’s more, the history of tensions 
between Windsor and Essex (Duck 2016a; 2016b), following a year-long negotiation and 
arbitration (Rice 1999) over CMSM agreements, could explain the findings of diminished 
cooperation between the municipalities. These challenges are not inconsistent with many city-
county relationships, whose forced cooperation led to disagreements, tensions, and arbitrations 
(Spicer 2015; 2016). In sum, considering this local context, the findings of this study’s GAT, and 
previous analysis of tensions resulting from inter-municipal agreements, the results look to be 
steady. EWEMS’s performance in the GAT would be improved by;  
 EWEMS publishing an independent annual report, and, 
 EWEMS providing a clear contact and process for citizen complaints, and, 
 The County of Essex establishing a joint land ambulance services committee. 
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Throughout the 1990s, Ontario underwent significant changes across the municipal 
landscape. With the election of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1995 under the promise to 
lower taxes (Ibbitson 1997), the 1990s were a very turbulent time for municipalities (Spicer 
2016). Local governments faced elimination and amalgamation (Siegel 2005), as well as a 
realignment of service responsibilities (Graham and Phillips 1998). One of the products of this 
realignment was the introduction of the CMSM program in 1998, which saw local municipalities 




Very quickly 37 designated CMSMs along with 10 district social services boards were forced 
into inter-municipal services agreements (Spicer 2015). Previous research by Spicer has 
demonstrated that these forced partnerships led to tensions and even legal challenges (2015, 
2016), particularly in city-county institutions. Spicer states that this was a failed assumption by 
the province that local governments would arrive at local solutions easily, even though city-
county institutions, created by the Province (2016), have a limited history of voluntary 
cooperation (2015). Since the introduction of these agreements, research has been completed in 
further understanding the CMSM organization and history of city-county institutions in Ontario 
(Spicer 2015, 2016). 
The complexity of city-county CMSM agreements, like many inter-local agreements, is 
further affected by the governance models established to deliver these services (Lyons and 
Spicer 2018). Special attention has been paid to the study of accountability in SPBs and other 
inter-municipal partnerships (Spicer 2017; Lyons and Spicer 2018; Lyons 2020). 
As a result of the provincial realignment, Ontario has designated 55 CMSMs for land 
ambulance service. Many of the CMSM designations were easily established, because of single-
tier, two-tier and regional organization (Spicer 2015). Further, with Indian Reserves and northern 
Ontario services boards, what remains is 13 city-county regions that were largely left to organize 
their own land-ambulance service agreements.   
With such an important life-saving service (Aringhieri et al. 2017), what is equally important 
is the delivery of that service. As Boyne notes, the performance of service delivery has always 
been the subject and interest of scholars (2006). Critical to the calculus of performance is the 




Therefore, decision-makers must consider the governance model when they look to ensure 
the performance of the services they are accountable for. And, when forced into inter-municipal 
cooperation and inter-local service delivery, it is important to recognize that these cooperative 
agreements inherently blur the lines of accountability (Lyons and Spicer 2018). What is left for 
elected officials forced into inter-local agreements, such as CMSMs, is to ensure that decisions 
they have authority over, are made with optimum democratic performance in mind. 
In order for municipalities to obtain sufficient information to make an important decision 
around democratic performance, they must rely on the ongoing research of scholars into factors 
that improve said performance. As mentioned, studies within Ontario have measured 
accountability in inter-local agreements (Spicer 2017) and SPBs (Lyons and Spicer 2018). 
Further, much review has been conducted on the establishment of the CMSM program, city-
county institutions, and their subsequent agreements (Spicer 2015, 2016).  
Previous studies demonstrate that CMSM agreements and city-county institutions are unique 
partnerships found in Ontario. This, combined with the research on a governance model’s effect 
on accountability and inter-local agreements, what is left is to provide further empirical data 
supporting the extent to which governance models in CMSM partnerships affect accountability. 
In this study, the 13 land-ambulance services covering city-county institutions were analyzed 
using a modified Governance Assessment Tool (GAT), previously used within the Ontario 
context, to operationalize the performance of each ambulance service. The results of the GAT 
were used to draw conclusions on how city-county land-ambulance services perform overall and 
categorized into their governance models. As all governance models, direct and contract 
delivery, as well as SPB, are represented in the 13 city-county land ambulance service, this 
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allowed for a great opportunity to further study CMSM agreements, and the effect of governance 
models on accountability. 
To bolster the findings of the GAT, two cases were selected to look at a real-life case 
comparison to determine if the GAT findings were consistent in two land-ambulance services 
within Ontario. Further, by purposefully selecting the most similar cases whose only distinct 
difference is their governance model, helps to strengthen previous studies' findings that 
governance models have an impact on accountability in the real world (Lyons and Spicer 2018). 
This paper finds that while land-ambulance services generally perform far better than 
previous research (Spicer 2017), there is variation in accountability across the 13 land ambulance 
services studied. Further, when the results of the GAT criteria are explored using a brief case 
study comparing EWEMS and MLPS, the study finds that they are supported by real-case 
examples of the challenges associated with city-county separation and inter-local service 
agreements. Variation in performance is aligned with previous research (Spicer 2017; Lyons and 
Spicer 2018) into inter-municipal agreements with various governance structures. In addition to 
the above, observations noted in the case study, guided by GAT performance, provide objective 
governance mechanisms that can be introduced to improve accountability. 
The variation in accountability looks to be correlated to the delivery model selected by the 
designated CMSM. Contracting the delivery of service appeared to be associated with poorer 
performance in the GAT. This was largely attributed to the public access to information. As 
many documents, such as the city-county CMSM agreement are available, the service contracts 
were not. This is not surprising, however, as the Municipal Act (Municipal Act SO 2001) permits 
these types of non-disclosure. Both direct delivery and SPB performed better on average than 
private delivery, however, SPB outperforms direct delivery in the GAT. This result of GAT 
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improvement with an SPB is consistent with previous literature (Spicer and Lyons 2018). 
However, with the overall strong performance across all services, the individual criterion was 
explored. What is observed is that the formation of a joint committee, with the representation of 
elected officials from all parties involved in the agreement, appeared to be associated with strong 
overall GAT performance. 
Other areas where performance generally missed the mark were the publication of an annual 
report and the creation of a specific and clear complaints process, separated from general 
inquiries through the service or municipality. Although not completed by many, those few that 
do satisfy this requirement, are ensuring that the public has access to sufficient information and a 
mechanism for sanctioning the service. Both of these elements are essential to a complete 
framework for accountability (Ebrahim and Weisband 2007).  
While the SPB outperforms all other governance models, decision-makers may not be ready 
to commit to this change. This is often a result of the authority board make-up, where Lyons 
notes that board positions are often not directly elected, and are therefore a “step removed from 
the electoral process” (2020, pp. 151). Despite this shortcoming, an SPBs design, which is at an 
arms-length from the CMSM and with the commitment to one specific service (Sancton 2015; 
Lyons 2020), appears to correlate with strong performance across the GAT. This is likely due to 
this arm-length design, which lends itself to specific and separate avenues for communication, 
annual reporting, and inter-municipal board representation.  
The overall strong performance of land-ambulance service should not be surprising. Land 
ambulance services are important, and expensive (Prno 2002). So it is not surprising that there is 
a strong degree of oversight. However, those partnerships that approach the CMSM with 
inclusive representation, despite their city-county separation, demonstrate improved 
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performance. Municipalities and land-ambulance services should look to ensure they establish 
land-ambulance joint committees that contain elected representation from every municipality 
within the CMSM partnership. Further, they should ensure that they satisfy the established 
frameworks for accountability, including providing the public with access to information and an 
avenue for sanctions. This can be accomplished by ensuring that annual reports are published 
and the ambulance service’s website contains a complaints process.  
Future studies should continue in this area, as the frequency of inter-local agreements 
continues to increase (Spicer 2017). While some challenge the authority of an SPB (Lyons 
2020), on balance they appear to improve accountability performance in inter-municipal 
agreements. Accountability in our most vital services, such as land-ambulance is crucial. For 
services looking for an eloquent solution to improving accountability in CMSM program service 
delivery, the establishment of an SPB, similar to that of Middlesex County, enables improved 




Alcantara, C. et al. (2012) Responding to Policy Change from Above: Municipal Accountability and 
Transparency Regimes in Ontario. Journal of Canadian studies. [Online] 46 (1), 112–137. 
Aringhieri, R., Bruni, M. E., Khodaparasti, S. and van Essen, J. T. 2017. “Emergency medical services 
and beyond: Addressing new challenges through a wide literature review.” Computers and Operations 
Research 78: 349-68 
Arbuckle, David W. (2018). Held to Account? An Analysis of Political Accountability in Ontario’s 
Municipal Sector. MPA Major Research Papers. 175. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lgp-mrps/175 
 
Badie, B., Berg-Schlosser, D. and Morlino, L. 2011. Accountability. In: Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-
Schlosser and Leonardo Morlino Editors, 2011. International Encyclopedia of Political Science, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. pp. 53-13 Available at: 
http://www.doi.org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/10.4135/9781412959636.n1 (Accessed 10 Jul 2021). 
 
BC Emergency Health Services. 2020 http://www.bcehs.ca/our-services/programs-services/ground-
ambulances (July 10, 2021) 
Boyne, G. A. (2006) Public service performance: perspectives on measurement and management / edited 
by George A. Boyne [and others]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brandsma, G. J. & Schillemans, T. (2013) The Accountability Cube: Measuring Accountability. Journal 
of public administration research and theory. [Online] 23 (4), 953–975.  
Breton, A. (1996) Competitive governments: an economic theory of politics and public finance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Breux, S., & Couture, J. (2018). Introduction. In S. Breux, J. Couture, Eds., Accountability 
and Responsiveness at the Municipal Level (p. 7). Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's 
University Press. 
Duck (a), P. “City vs. County: The rising cost of ambulance service.” Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation Online (Windsor), April 6, 2016 - https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/windsor/city-vs-county-
the-rising-cost-of-ambulance-service-1.3521679 
Duck (b), P. “City vs. County: Tensions still high between Windsor, Essex.” Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation Online (Windsor), April 6, 2016 - https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/windsor/tensions-at-
play-windsor-essex-1.3519956 
Ebrahim, A. & Weisband, E. (2007) Global Accountabilities: Participation, Pluralism, and Public Ethics. 
[Online]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Essex County, 2021. Budget. [online] Available at: www.countyofessex.ca%2Fen%2Fcounty-
government%2Fresources%2FDocuments%2FFinance-Docs%2FApproved-2021-Budget-ACC-
FINAL.pdf&clen=6772793&chunk=true (July 10, 2021) 
Fearon, James D. (1999) “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types 
versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” In Democracy, Accountability, Representation, edited by Adam 
Prezeworski, Susan E. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 55-98. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
48 
 
Found, A. (2012) Economies of Scale in Fire and Police Services in Ontario. Institute on Municipal 
Finance and Governance, Munk School of Global Affairs. 
Graham, K. A. & Phillips, S. D. (1998) ‘Who Does What’ in Ontario: The process of provincial-
municipal disentanglement. Canadian public administration. [Online] 41 (2), 175–209. 




Hanretty, C. & Koop, C. (2012) Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies. Journal of 
European public policy. [Online] 19 (2), 198–216.  
Ibbitson, J. (1997) Promised land: inside the Mike Harris revolution. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall 
Canada. 
Liesbet, H. & Gary, M. (2003) Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level 
Governance. The American political science review. [Online] 97 (2), 233–243.  
 
Justice, J. B. et al. (2006) E-Government as an Instrument of Fiscal Accountability and Responsiveness: 
Do the Best Practitioners Employ the Best Practices? American review of public administration. [Online] 
36 (3), 301–322. 
Le May R., Davies R., Dionne R., Maloney J., Trickett J., So D., Ha A., Sherrard H., Glover C., Marquis 
JF., O’Brien E., Stiell I G., Poirier P and Marino Labinaz M. 2006. “Comparison of Early Mortality of 
Paramedic-Diagnosed ST-Segment Elevation Myocardial Infarction With Immediate Transport to a 
Designated Primary Percutaneous Coronary Intervention Center to That of Similar Patients Transported to 
the Nearest Hospital.” The American Journal of Cardiology: 98(10), 1329-33 
London. County of Middlesex, By-law No. 6351, To Create A Municipal Service Board For The 
Provision Of Land Ambulance Services (11 October, 2011). 
London. County of Middlesex, By-law No. 6356, To appoint members to the Middlesex-London 
Emergency Medical Services Authority (22 November, 2011). 
London. London Council Chambers. 2020a. (5.2) 2nd Report of the County/City Liaison Committee. 
London: London City Council. 
London. London Council Chambers. 2020b. (8.c) Middlesex-London Emergency Medical Services 
Authority – Terms of Reference and Code of Conduct. London: London City Council. 
London. Middlesex Council Chambers. 2021. Middlesex County 2021 Budget Meeting. London: 
Middlesex County Council. 
London Police Services Board. 2021. 2020 Annual Report. https://www.londonpolice.ca/en/about/2020-
annual-report.aspx (July 10, 2021) 
Longeway, M. (2020) “A Comparative Analysis of Ontario’s Land-Ambulance Service Delivery 
Models”. GDPA Final Research Paper. Unpublished.  
Lyons, J. R. (2014) Structural Variation and Local Service Delivery: Comparing Municipal Governments 




Lyons, J. (2015) Conservation authority board composition and watershed management in 
Ontario. Canadian Public Administration. [Online] 58 (2), 315–332. 
Lyons, Joseph and Zachary Spicer. (2018) “Accountability and Local Collaborative Governance.” In S. 
Breux, J. Couture, & (Eds.), Accountability and Responsiveness at the Municipal Level (pp. 197-220). 
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
 
Lyons, J. (2020) “The Democratic Dimensions of Specialized Governments.” In Cameron D. Anderson 
and Laura Beth Stephenson, What is democracy and how do we study it? Chapter 9. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press  
Middlesex-London Paramedic Service. 2020. Annual Reports. https://www.mlems.ca/about-us/annual-
reports (July 10, 2021) 
Mullin, M. (2009) Governing the tap: special district governance and the new local politics of water . 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Ontario. Ambulance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 19 
Newcombe, D. “Councillor questions rise in city’s portion of ambulance budget”. CTV News (London), 
June 16, 2020.  https://london.ctvnews.ca/councillor-questions-rise-in-city-s-portion-of-ambulance-
budget-1.4985938 
Ontario. Ambulance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 19 
Ontario. Office of the Provincial Auditor. 1998. Emergency Health Services. Toronto: Office of the 
Provincial Auditor. 
Ontario. 1999. Local Services Realignment: A User’s Guide. Toronto: Province of Ontario 
Ontario. Ministry of Health. 2019. Ambulance Dispatch Reporting System. Provincial Database. (June 11, 
2019) 
Ontario. Municipal Act, SO 2001, c 25  
Prno, J. M. (2002) "Devolution or Downloading: The Financial and Service Effects of Local Services 
Realignment on Ontario Ambulance Services". MPA Major Research Papers. 38. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lgp-mrps/38 
Rice, W. (1999) Division of Costs Arbitration Between the Corporation of the County of Essex, the 
Corporation of the Township of Pelee and the Corporation of the City of Windsor. Sudbury. 
 
Richmond, D. E. & Siegel, D. (1994) Agencies, boards and commissions in Canadian local government. 
Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada.  
 
Sancton, Andrew. (1998) “Negotiating, Arbitrating, Legislating: Where Was the Public in London’s 
Boundary Adjustment?” In Citizen Engagement: Lessons in Participation from Local Government, edited 
by Katerine A. Graham and Susan D. Phillips, 163–87. Toronto: The Institute of Public Administration of 
Canada. 
 
Sancton, A. (2015) Canadian local government: an urban perspective. Second edition. Don Mills, 




Sancton, A. (2018) “What Happened to Incumbent Councillors in Greater Sudbury and London, Ontario, 
in 2014? The Role of the Ontario Ombudsman's Report on Alleged Secret Meetings.” In S. Breux, J. 
Couture, & (Eds.), Accountability and Responsiveness at the Municipal Level (pp. 132–152). Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
 
Siegel, David. (1994a) “The ABCs of Local Government: An Overview.” In Agencies, Boards, and 
Commissions in Canadian Local Government, ed. Dale Richmond and David Siegel. Toronto: The 
Institute of Public Administration Canada. 
 
Siegel, David. (1994b) “The Appropriate Use of Agencies, Boards, and Commissions.” In Agencies, 
Boards, and Commissions in Canadian Local Government, edited by Dale Richmond and David Siegel, 
83–110. Toronto: The Institute of Public Administration Canada. 
 
Siegel, D. (2005) “Municipal Reform in Ontario.” In Municipal Reform in Canada: Reconfiguration, Re-
Empowerment and Rebalancing, edited by J. Garcea and E.C. Lesage Jr. Toronto: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Skelcher, C. et al. (2005) The Public Governance of Collaborative Spaces: Discourse, Design and 
Democracy. Public administration (London). [Online] 83 (3), 573–596. 
Slack, E. & Bird, R. (2013) Merging Municipalities: Is Bigger Better? Institute on Municipal Finance and 
Governance, Munk School of Global Affairs.  
Statistics Canada. 2017a. Census Profile, 2016 Census. Essex, CTY. Ottawa. Released 
November 29, 2017. 
https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang=E (accessed July 9, 
2021). 
Statistics Canada. 2017b. Census Profile, 2016 Census. Middlesex, CTY. Ottawa. Released 
November 29, 2017. 
https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang=E (accessed July 9, 
2021). 
Spicer, Z. (2014) The Ties That Bind? Exploring the Dynamics of Intermunicipal Agreement Formation 
between Separated Cities and Counties. Canadian public policy. [Online] 40 (3), 245–258. 
Spicer, Z. (2015) Adapting (Municipal) Form to (Provincial) Function: City-County Separation and the 
Introduction of the Consolidated Municipal Service Manager System in Ontario, Canada. The American 
review of Canadian studies. [Online] 45 (3), 346–364. 
Spicer, Z. (2016) Boundary Bargain: Growth, Development, and the Future of City-County Separation. 
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Spicer, Z. (2017) Bridging the accountability and transparency gap in inter-municipal collaboration. Local 
government studies. [Online] 43 (3), 388–407.  
Sweet, R. (1999) The English town, 1680-1840: government, society and culture. Singapore: Longman.  
Tindal, C. R. & Tindal, S. N. (2004) Local government in Canada. 6th ed. Toronto: Nelson.  
Wang, X. (2002) Assessing Administrative Accountability: Results from a National Survey. American 
review of public administration. [Online] 32 (3), 350–370.  
51 
 










Appendix A – List of City-County Institutions 
 
City-County Region Municipalities (upper-tier and separated 
cities) 
Simcoe County City of Barrie 
City of Orillia 
County of Simcoe 
Essex County Windsor,  
Essex County  
Township of Pelee Island 
Wellington County Guelph 
County of Wellington 
Middlesex County London 
County of Middlesex 
Frontenac County Kingston 
County of Frontenac 
Peterborough County Peterborough 
Peterborough County 
Renfrew County Pembroke 
Renfrew County 
The United Counties of Leeds and Grenville 
 
City of Brockville  
Town of Gananoque  
Town of Prescott 











City of Belleville 
City of Quite West 
The County of Hastings 
Perth County Town of St. Mary’s 
City of Stratford 
Perth County 
Cornwall Cornwall 






Appendix B – Table of CMSM Agreements 
 
CMSM Region CMSM Agreement/By-Law Date 
Simcoe County BY-LAW No. 4871 
BY-LAW No. 5770 
November 2002, April 2009 
Essex County Division of Costs Arbitration  March 1999 
Wellington County Municipal Service Management Agreement – 
March 2000 
March 2000 
Middlesex County BY-LAW No. 6353 – Creation of SPB 
Land Ambulance Services Cost Apportion 
Agreement 
October 2011, January 2018 
Frontenac County Municipal Service Management Agreement – 
August 2005 
Division of Costs Arbitration 
July 2004, November 2004, 
August 2005 
Peterborough County BY-LAW No. 50-2003 
BY-LAW No. 50-1998 
Amendment to Appendix A of CMSM Agreement 
– Unknown date 2019 
May 1998, November 2003, 
No date 2019 
Renfrew County Renfrew County and Pembroke Arbitration January 2001 
The United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville 
BY-LAW No. 03-39 
Joint Operating Agreement – May 2000 
May 2000, July 2003 
Lanark County 
 
BY-LAW No. 8017-2006, and  
BY-LAW No. 2006-41, and  
BY-LAW No. 8101-2007 
September 2000, October 
2006, December 2007 
Elgin County 
 
Consolidation Agreement Elgin/St. Thomas 
Consolidation Plan for The County of Elgin and 




BY-LAW No. 99-60 
Municipal Service Management Agreement – 
March 2000 
BY-LAW No. 00-75 
BY-LAW No. 2006-70 
September 1999, March 2000, 
June 2000, April 2006 
Perth County BY-LAW NO. 24-1998 
BY-LAW No. 32-98 
Municipal Service Management Agreement – 
March 1998 
Amendment Municipal Service Management 
Agreement – January 2000 
Amendment Municipal Service Management 
Agreement – August 2003 
 
March 1998, January 2000, 
August 2003 
Cornwall BY-LAW No. 001-2002 
BY-LAW No. 002-2002 
BY-LAW No. 095-2002 
Municipal Service Management Agreement – 
No By-Law No. 
January 2002, June 2002, No 





Appendix C – Completed Modified Governance Assessment Tool 
 
 Modified Governance Assessment Criteria 



















    
Cornwall 2 0.8 1.0 0.786 0.86 
Elgin 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.53 
Essex-Windsor 3 1.0 0.667 0.857 0.83 
Frontenac-
Kingston 2 
1.0 0.667 0.786 0.81 
Guelph-
Wellington 2 
0.8 0.833 0.857 0.83 
Hastings 3 1.0 1.0 0.857 0.94 
Lanark 2 0.9 1.0 0.714 0.81 
Leeds & 
Grenville 4 
0.8 1.0 0.571 0.77 
Middlesex-
London 2 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Perth 3 0.7 1.0 0.786 0.83 
Peterborough 2 1.0 1.0 0.857 0.94 
Renfrew 2 1.0 1.0 0.786 0.92 
Simcoe 3 1.0 1.0 0.857 0.89 
      
Average Score  0.885 0.987 0.786 0.843 
      
No colour represents direct delivery by the designated CMSM 
Blue represents some degree of contracted service delivery 
Orange represents delivery through SPB 
 
 
 
 
